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ABSTRACT
This article critically analyses the legal history of 
the Chagos Archipelago and its inhabitants. This 
is a story of multiple domestic and international 
courts, from the domestic jurisdiction of the 
United Kingdom to the Advisory Opinion 
recently adopted by the International Court of 
Justice. This article discusses the main judicial 
decisions adopted since the detachment of the 
archipelago from Mauritius in 1965 to the ruling 
of the International Court of Justice in 2019. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
In its recent Advisory Opinion of 25 
February 2019, the International Court of 
Justice clarified the situation of the Chagos 
Archipelago under international law. It affirmed 
that the right to self-determination of peoples 
was already part of customary international law 
by the end of 1960 and that the exercise of such a 
right requires respect for the territorial integrity 
of non-self-governing territories.1 Applied to the 
situation of Mauritius and the Chagos Islands, 
this meant that the detachment of the Chagos 
Archipelago in 1965 did not allow for the lawful 
completion of the process of decolonisation of 
Mauritius when reaching its independence in 
1968, given that part of its territory remained 
under colonial administration.2 In turn, this 
means that the United Kingdom’s continued 
administration of the Chagos Archipelago 
amounts to an internationally wrongful act of a 
continuing character.3 The Court also decided 
that it was for the United Nations General 
Assembly to establish the modalities needed for 
ensuring the completion of the decolonisation 
of Mauritius.4 This article critically analyses the 
legal history of the Chagos Archipelago, from the 
time in which it was detached from Mauritius 
to the recent Advisory Opinion adopted by the 
International Court of Justice.
2. THE ISLANDERS
The Chagos Islands are coral atolls lying 
about 2,200 miles east of the African coast 
and 1,000 miles south-west of India. The 
archipelagic islands, consisting of 65 in total, 
were ceded by France to Great Britain in 1814 
with the coming into force of the Treaty of Paris 
from which time they continued to be governed 
as Dependencies of Mauritius (which is about 
1,200 miles South-South-West). By 1959, the 
government of Mauritius was openly seeking 
complete independence. Although Mauritius 
gained its independence from colonial rule in 
March 1968, the Chagos Islands were retained 
by the United Kingdom, for which a sum of £3 
million was paid and a promise made to cede the 
islands to Mauritius when they were no longer 
needed for defence purposes.5 The islands were 
retained as part of a strategic defence plan that 
had been discussed between the United States 
and United Kingdom at least since the early 
1960s when the independence of Mauritius 
seemed an inevitable outcome. The imperative 
to retain these islands came from the global 
political affairs of that period; the Cuban missile 
crisis and looming Vietnam war left the United 
States vulnerable, and the Suez crisis accorded the 
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United Kingdom a significantly weakened global 
position. Consequently, in September 1965, 
at the Lancaster House Meeting, the United 
Kingdom and Mauritius agreed the terms of the 
detachment of the Chagos Islands. The islands 
were constituted as the British Indian Ocean 
Territory (BIOT) on 8 November 1965 by Order 
in Council (SI 1965/1920), which also provided 
for the appointment of a Commissioner for the 
Territory.6 Under the terms of that Order, the 
Commissioner was empowered to make laws for 
the ‘peace, order and good government’ of the 
Territory.
On 30 December 1966, the United States 
and United Kingdom signed a 50-year agreement 
to lease the Chagos Islands for military 
purposes.7 Diego Garcia, the main island of 
the archipelago, continues to be the site of the 
United States’ military base Camp Justice. The 
agreement between the United Kingdom and the 
United States stated that the islands would be 
without a resident civilian population. How to 
manage the Islands’ population consequently 
became a delicate, yet central, question. 
According to the United Kingdom, the Chagos 
Islands were inhabited only by migrant workers 
with no property rights. This has been exposed 
through subsequent litigation as a ‘legal façade’.8 
The House of Lords described the population 
in remarkably different terms from those used 
by the United Kingdom: ‘…they had a rich 
community life, the Roman Catholic religion 
and their own distinctive dialect derived (like 
those of Mauritius and the Seychelles) from 
the French’.9 Removal was effected through 
deception and, ultimately, making life on the 
islands for the Chagossians unsustainable. The 
main industry was copra, and in April 1967, by 
virtue of BIOT Ordinance Number Two, the 
BIOT administration acquired the land and the 
commercial interest of the company operating 
the copra plantations on the island, Chagos-
Agalega Ltd, which had bought the plantations 
in 1962. The plantations were leased back 
to the company until such time as they were 
required by the US, with the plantation on 
Diego Garcia closed in 1971. Plantations formed 
the main industry and source of employment 
on the islands; their closure spelled the end 
of the Chaggosian’s way of life on the Islands. 
That same year, the Commissioner enacted 
an Immigration Ordinance making it unlawful 
for a person to enter or remain in the BIOT 
without a permit and allowed for the removal 
of those islanders remaining.10 The islands were 
depopulated by April 1973. 
The transfer of the population was effected 
without sufficient planning and support for the 
Chagossians; life in Mauritius for the islanders 
was one of ‘high unemployment and considerable 
poverty. Their conditions were miserable’.11 
Laura Jeffery offers the following description of 
their desperate situation: 
By the time the Chagos islanders started 
to arrive at the docks in the capital Port Louis, 
Mauritius in general and Port Louis in particular 
were suffering from a severe shortage of housing 
stick. This was the result of high population 
growth and density plus the devastating 
effects, especially on poor-quality housing, of 
recent cyclones…Upon arrival in Mauritius, 
most Chagos islanders were homeless, had to 
seek new accommodation, and had to pay for 
accommodation (unlike in Chagos).12
Yet those islanders moved to Mauritius 
nonetheless retained their British Dependent 
Territories citizenship. Although the numbers 
of Chagossians removed during this period is 
not clear, it seems likely to have been a figure of 
well over a thousand people.13 
The scale of the disregard of the rights of the 
islanders is breath-taking. The United Kingdom 
was, of course, not oblivious to its obligations, 
and a secret memorandum shows that it was 
particularly sensitive to its obligations under the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Resolution 
1514 XV of 14 December 1960 and subject to 
the scrutiny of the Committee of 24 (Special 
Committee on Decolonization).14 The formal 
position thus became that the islands had no 
permanent population. Consequently, BIOT, 
in contrast to other British overseas territories, 
is not on the United Nations’ list of non-self-
governing territories. Adam Tomkins refers 
to this as a ‘deliberate fabrication on the part 
of British officials’.15 Somewhat infamously, 
documents submitted during the English court 
hearings revealed that a senior official at the 
Foreign Office wrote to a diplomat in 1966: ‘…
there will be no indigenous population except 
seagulls who have not yet got a Committee (the 
Status of Women Committee does not cover the 
rights of Birds)’. The response from the head 
of the Colonial Office, DA Greenhill, was the 
following: ‘Unfortunately, along with the Birds 
go some few Tarzans or Men Fridays whose 
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origins are obscure, and who are being hopefully 
wished on to Mauritius.’16 In the words of Lord 
Justice Laws, ‘It is as if some of the officials felt 
that if they willed it hard enough, they might 
bring about the desired result, and there would 
be no such permanent population’.17
The matter of the BIOT was raised almost 
immediately in the General Assembly, which 
in December 1965 noted the detachment of 
the Chagos Islands with concern and approved 
the reports of the Special Committee on the 
Situation with regard to the Implementation of 
the Declaration on the Granting of Independence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating 
to Mauritius.18 In 1972, the United Kingdom 
paid Mauritius £650,000 towards resettling the 
Chagossian population. Pursuant to a private 
law case brought by Michel Vincatassin, and 
also violent clashes in Mauritius by Chagossian 
activists,19 an agreement was signed in July 1982 
in which the United Kingdom Government 
agreed to pay £4 million compensation to 
the Chagossians in return for the islanders 
renouncing all claims arising out of their 
removal from their island homes. This was to be 
the start of decades of litigation, both national 
and international, aimed to remedy and resolve 
two inter-related but separate issues: firstly, 
the violation of the rights of the Chagossians 
expelled from their island homes; and, secondly, 
the question, increasingly pressed by Mauritius, 
of sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago. 
a. Bancoult I: ‘the wintry asperity of 
authority’
In 2000, Olivier Bancoult, a Chagossian 
born in Peros Banhos in 1964, sought judicial 
review (specifically, a writ of certiorari) against 
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.20 
In 1967, when he was the age of three, the 
applicant’s family had travelled from their home 
to Mauritius to seek medical treatment for his 
sister; they never returned. The challenge was 
partly that the Immigration Ordinance of 1971, 
purportedly made under section 11 of the 1965 
Order, was ultra vires. While the applicant’s 
arguments based on constitutional rights were 
rejected, Laws LJ held, with respect to the ‘peace, 
order and good government’ provision outlining 
the Commissioner’s powers to legislate for the 
island, that it ‘may be a very large tapestry, 
but every tapestry has a border’.21 His stark 
conclusion on the question of ultra vires was that 
he could not ‘see how the wholesale removal of 
a people from the land where they belong can 
be said to conduce to the territory’s peace, order 
and good government…’22
Consequently, the 1971 Immigration 
Ordinance was quashed. The Foreign Secretary, 
Robin Cook, responded immediately to 
the judgment: ‘I have decided to accept the 
Court’s ruling and the Government will not be 
appealing’.23 The 1971 Ordinance was revoked 
and replaced with BIOT Immigration Ordinance 
No 4 of 2000, which allowed Chagossians 
to return to all islands except Diego Garcia 
without permits. Robin Cook, however, also 
made reference to ‘feasibility work’, and it 
was clear that the practical hurdles would be 
considerable: awaiting the Report’s conclusions, 
no islanders returned to live in the outer Chagos 
islands. Meanwhile, in 2002, the validity of the 
1982 settlement was confirmed by the Queen’s 
Bench.24 On appeal, Sedley LJ remarked: ‘It may 
not be too late to make return possible, but such 
an outcome is a function of economic resources 
and political will, not of adjudication’.25 
Nonetheless, and despite the obvious practical 
obstacles to resettlement, legal strategies 
continue to be a central part of the Chagossians’ 
struggle. 
Although Bancoult I was clearly welcomed 
by the applicant and was a significant 
administrative law decision, a less-promising 
aspect of the judgment that is less discussed 
is the approach taken to constitutional rights. 
Looking at this element of the Bancoult I 
decision demonstrates the precariousness of the 
islanders’ human rights position. The applicant 
had argued that his rights under the Magna Carta 
should be respected. The Queen’s Bench, relying 
on Liyanage v The Queen,26 held otherwise: 
Belongers here take the benefit of the 
constraints which the common law imposes on 
the construction of legislation which interferes 
with such rights; belongers there do not. However, 
I think it plain that in practice, in the post-
imperial world as it is, this is a misfit which nearly 
always will be nothing but theoretical; territories 
such as Gibraltar possess written constitutions 
which enshrine fundamental rights based on or 
akin to the model of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. But BIOT does not, and there 
is therefore a dissonance, one which may strike 
real loves, between the richness of the rights 
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which our municipal law today affords and the 
wintry asperity of authority…27
Because Mauritius and the Chagos Islands 
were ceded, the applicable (arcane) rule was 
that the law of the land as was continued until 
changed. Thus, the common law was not deemed 
to be the same as that applicable in the United 
Kingdom, and more particularly, the rights of 
the Magna Carta were held to be inapplicable. 
This constitutional aspect of the decision 
– that is, the rejection of the argument that 
the islanders enjoy the same rights as other 
British citizens – opened the door to a dramatic 
volte-face on the part of the Government. 
The decision to allow the islanders to return 
failed to withstand the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001, which, in the United States’ 
eyes, heightened the strategic importance of 
the islands from a defence perspective. In turn, 
the June 2002 Feasibility Report concluded that 
return, certainly to the islanders’ former way 
of life, was not possible: global warming was 
among the many factors indicated as pointing to 
this conclusion. Thus, the Government decided 
not to support resettlement.28 
b. Bancoult II: ‘The law gives it and the 
law may take it away’
In 2004, the United Kingdom government 
drafted two Orders in Council, the BIOT 
(Constitution) Order 200429 and the BIOT 
(Immigration) Order 2004, which again restored 
immigration control and removed the islanders’ 
right to enter, or be present on, the Chagos 
Islands without permission. The Orders were 
not debated in Parliament and were assented 
to exercising prerogative powers. Before the 
Administrative Court, the Orders were quashed 
on the basis that they were not made in the 
interests of the islanders, a decision affirmed by 
the Court of Appeal. That decision was appealed 
to the House of Lords.30 In a landmark ruling 
well-known to students of English law, the 
House of Lords, affirming the decision of the 
lower courts on this particular point, held that 
there was no reason why prerogative legislation 
should not be subject to the same scrutiny 
(judicial review) as other prerogative acts. 
While the door to review had been opened, both 
constitutional and administrative law presented 
further blocks to quashing the Orders.
For the domestic courts, the primary 
question was whether an Order in Council, 
classified as primary legislation for the purposes 
of the Human Rights Act 1998, could be 
overridden by the judiciary. To that question, 
Lord Hoffmann, delivering the majority 
judgment, answered that he saw ‘no reason why 
prerogative legislation should not be subject 
to review on ordinary principles of legality, 
rationality and procedural impropriety in the 
same way as any other executive action’.31 That 
decision was accepted unanimously. He further 
held, along with Lords Bingham and Mance, 
that the Order in Council was not a colonial 
law for the purposes of reviewing the exercise of 
prerogative powers by Her Majesty in Council 
(hence non-application of the Colonial Laws 
Validity Act 1865, which would have had the 
effect of ousting the Court’s jurisdiction).32 
Despite opening the door to review, that 
review was to prove extremely light touch: Lord 
Hoffmann held that the Crown could remove a 
right of abode by Order in Council and that in 
this case that power had been exercised lawfully. 
Following the logic of Bancoult I, Hoffmann 
held that ‘In a ceded colony…the Crown has 
plenary legislative authority. It can make or 
unmake the law of the land’.33 Consequently, 
while the Chagossians have a constitutional 
right to abode, ‘there seems to me no basis for 
saying that the right of abode is in its nature so 
fundamental that the legislative powers of the 
Crown simply cannot touch it’.34 He further 
rejected the argument that in legislating for the 
islands, the crown is restricted to ruling for the 
peace, order and good governance, or otherwise 
for the benefit of the inhabitants of that colony: 
‘Her Majesty in Council is … entitled to legislate 
for a colony in the interests of the United 
Kingdom…’ and, furthermore, is ‘entitled…to 
prefer the interests of the United Kingdom’.35 
Reviewing the decision using ordinary 
principles of administrative law, Lord Hoffmann 
was not persuaded that the fundamental right 
of abode was in issue. That issue, he reasoned, 
had been argued long ago and compensated 
for. Given the impracticality of return without 
considerable financial support from the United 
Kingdom Government, the current legal action, 
he reasoned, was effectively part of a protest. 
Consequently, the House of Lords’ review as 
to the irrationality of the Order was from the 
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outset contorted into a very light touch. Security 
interests clearly weighed heavily in its decision. 
Alarmingly, Lord Hoffmann included in his 
reasoning an assertion that it was within the 
powers (that is, it would not be irrational) of the 
Foreign Secretary to take into account the fact 
that permitting resettlement without adequate 
support would engage the scrutiny of the United 
Nations under article 73 of the Charter.36 
Further, the majority held that the argument 
that the applicant had a legitimate expectation 
of being permitted to return home based on the 
Foreign Secretary’s response to Bancoult II was 
unfounded. The promise made at that time was 
subject to the outcome of the Feasibility Report. 
Each Lord Law expressed considerable sympathy 
for the islanders; but the majority could not 
find a way for their rights to be protected. In the 
words of Lord Carswell:
No one could fail to feel distressed about 
their plight at that time. It is the function of the 
courts, however, to adjudicate upon legal rights, 
and no matter how sympathetic they may be to 
a party who has been badly treated in the past, 
they are required to apply the law in the present 
and apply it properly and impartially – in the 
words of the Book of Common Prayer, truly and 
indifferently minister justice.37 
Lord Bingham was in the minority in holding 
that the orders were irrational because they had 
been made without good reason.38 Stephen Allen 
argues, ‘Had the House of Lords chosen to follow 
the more appropriate standard outlined by Lord 
Woolf in Coughlan, it would have been difficult 
for it to conclude that a change of policy was 
warranted on the evidence provided’.39
The idea that international law might 
have relevance to the resolution of the claim 
was given short shrift by Lord Hoffmann: ‘As 
for international law, I do not understand how, 
consistently with the well-established doctrine 
that it does not form part of domestic law, it 
can support any argument for the invalidity of 
a purely domestic law’.40 Allen is surely using 
under-statement when he describes this as an 
‘abrupt conclusion’.41 
c. To the European Court of Human 
Rights: ‘no more relevance in BIOT 
than a local government statute’
The United Kingdom, when ratifying the 
European Convention on Human Rights, had 
extended that ratification under Article 56 
(the ‘colonial clause’, formerly Article 63) to 
Mauritius. On creating the BIOT, however, no 
such declaration was made. The House of Lords 
had held that the Convention consequently did 
not extend to the BIOT; in the words of Lord 
Hoffmann, ‘BIOT is not part of the United 
Kingdom and the Human Rights Act, though it 
may be part of the law of England, has no more 
relevance in BIOT than a local government 
statute for Birmingham’.42 That argument 
was to be tested before the European Court of 
Human Rights.43 
An application to the European Court 
of Human Rights was lodged by a group of 
Chagossians44 resident in Mauritius, the 
Seychelles and the United Kingdom in September 
2004. The applicants complained of a violation 
of Article 3 (freedom from torture and inhumane 
and degrading treatment); Article 8 (right to 
respect for private life and home); Article 1 
Protocol 1 (right to property); and Article 6 (right 
to a fair trial). Finally, they claimed a violation 
of their Article 13 right to an effective remedy. 
Once again, the islanders met with considerable 
sympathy - the Court referred to their treatment 
from 1967-1973 as ‘callous and shameful’45 – 
yet were left with no legal redress for the wrongs 
done to them.
The applicants argued that, in spite of 
the non-applicability of the colonial clause, the 
Convention’s reach extended extraterritorially 
because the United Kingdom exercised effective 
control over the islands. The Human Rights 
Committee had already taken the view that the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights extends to the BIOT, in spite of the 
United Kingdom’s insistence that it does not.46 
The Government argued that Article 56 provided 
an insurmountable hurdle to the applicants’ 
claims: the right of individual petition, although 
a declaration had been made for Mauritius, 
had not been extended to BIOT since it was 
established.47 As to the relationship between 
the principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
under Article 1 and the colonial clause in Article 
56, the Court referred to ‘constant case-law to 
the effect that no jurisdiction arose where a 
Contracting State had not, through a declaration 
under Article 56 … , extended the Convention 
or any of its Protocols to an overseas territory for 
who international relations it was responsible’.48 
Once again, it seems that law was to stand in 
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the way of justice: ‘Anachronistic as colonial 
remnants may be, the meaning of Article 56 
is plain on its face and it cannot be ignored 
merely because of a perceived need to right an 
injustice.’49 Further, neither the fact that many 
of the applicants were now resident in the United 
Kingdom, nor the fact that the Order had been 
made in the United Kingdom, was sufficient to 
bring the violations within the jurisdiction of the 
Court. In any event, the Court reassured itself, 
the applicants could not claim to be victims of a 
violation because their claims had already been 
settled though civil claims. In settling, the Court 
held, the applicants renounced further use of 
remedies (as for those applicants who had not 
personally agreed to a settlement, their claims 
failed for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies). 
Again, the islanders’ claims were, at least 
implicitly, viewed as being extra-legal insofar 
as they formed part of an ‘overall campaign to 
bring pressure to bear on government policy 
rather than disclosing any new situation giving 
rise to fresh claims under the Convention’.50 
The applicants’ claims were dismissed for being 
manifestly ill-founded.
d. Bancoult III and the Marine 
Protected Area
Meanwhile, in 2009 it was revealed that 
the idea of a Marine Protected Area (MPA) in the 
Chagos Islands with a total ban on commercial 
fishing was being considered. The Government, 
highlighting the environment benefits of an 
MPA, ultimately implemented the idea by 
Proclamation No. 1 of 2010.51 Covering more 
than half a million square kilometres, it was the 
largest MPA in the world. Mauritius, however, 
determined that its revived – and increasingly 
forcefully asserted – claim to sovereignty 
over the Chagos Islands52 was considerably 
affected by this decision. The matter was 
consequently referred to arbitration, as per the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS). Mauritius claims included 
that the United Kingdom was in violation of 
UNCLOS because it was not the coastal State, 
and that the United Kingdom’s declaration of 
the MPA was incompatible with its obligations 
under UNCLOS. Mauritius argued that it had 
consistently asserted its sovereignty over the 
Chagos Islands since the 1980s, both before 
the United Nations General Assembly and in 
bilateral communications.53 The tribunal issued 
its award on 18 March 2015 In the Matter of 
the Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration 
(Mauritius v UK).54 It found that the manner of 
the creation of the MPA disregarded Mauritius’ 
rights and was consequently unlawful. The 
tribunal, however, disclaimed jurisdiction over 
the sovereignty issues raised by Mauritius in 
their submissions (Judges Kateka and Wolfrum 
dissenting on this point55); its award was 
concerned with the procedural aspect of the 
MPA’s creation in light of the Lancaster House 
Undertakings made when the islands were 
detached from Mauritius. The tribunal viewed 
these undertakings as both a sine qua none 
of the agreement and binding on the United 
Kingdom as a matter of international law. 
Specifically, it held that the United Kingdom 
had failed in its obligations to meaningfully 
consult with Mauritius in the creation of the 
MPA, which amounted to a breach of UNCLOS 
Articles 2(3), 56(2) and 194(4). Despite side-
stepping the sovereignty question, Michael 
Waibel argued that the ‘arbitration itself put 
the United Kingdom in the awkward position 
of having to defend a colonial legacy in the 
Indian Ocean whose establishment is at least 
in tension with the legal principles applicable to 
decolonization’.56
Although the question of Mauritius’ rights 
had thus begun to be asserted in legal fora, what 
the UNCLOS arbitration had not dwelt on was 
the connection between the creation of the MPA 
and the continued exclusion of the Chagossians 
from their homes. A further claim resulting from 
the decision to create an MPA, that once again 
went all the way to the highest domestic court, 
was brought by Olivier Bancoult. He argued his 
case before the English courts on two grounds: 
firstly, that the consultation process had failed 
to disclose that the creation of a ‘no take’ zone 
would interfere with Mauritian inshore fishing 
rights; secondly, the decision had been taken 
for an improper purpose (that is, to prevent 
the possibility of islanders returning to their 
homes).57 The second argument was supported 
by documents sent from the United States’ 
Embassy in London to the United States Federal 
Government reporting on a meeting with 
officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office that had been revealed by WikiLeaks. The 
brief report attributed the following comments 
to Mr Roberts, Secretary of State:
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7. Roberts stated that according to the 
HGM’s [sic] current thinking on a reserve, 
there would be no ‘human footprints’ or ‘Man 
Fridays’ on the BIOT’s uninhabited islands. He 
asserted that establishing a marine park would, 
in effect, put paid to resettlement claims of the 
archipelago’s former residents …
Establishing a marine reserve might indeed, 
as FCO’s Roberts stated, be the most effective 
long-term way to prevent any of the Chagos 
Islands’ former inhabitants or their descendants 
from resettling in the BIOT. 58
While ruling against the Divisional Court’s 
decision that the cable was inadmissible, the 
Majority of the Supreme Court nonetheless 
found that there was no evidence that excluding 
this evidence had any material bearing on the 
outcome of the proceedings. Still less did it have 
bearing on the decision of Mr Milliband, the 
Foreign Secretary whose ultimate decision it was 
to establish the MPA. As Paul Daly has observed: 
This must be a difficult defeat for the 
Chagossians to stomach. It is very difficult in 
judicial review cases to uncover evidence of 
improper purposes but here the claimants had, 
by chance, what they must have thought looked 
like an obvious smoking gun. To learn that even 
this was insufficient to make out a successful 
judicial review claim must have come as an 
unfortunate surprise.59
The Supreme Court further held that 
Mauritian fishing interests could have been 
asserted during the consultation process. Once 
again, the English courts proved unreceptive to 
the islanders’ plight. The sovereignty question, 
and that of self-determination, however, were 
not over.
3. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE ON THE SEPARATION OF 
THE CHAGOS ARCHIPELAGO
On 22 June 2017 the UN General Assembly 
requested the International Court of Justice 
to render an Advisory Opinion on the ‘legal 
consequences of the separation of the Chagos 
Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965’. With 
the affirmative vote of 94 Member States,60 the 
General Assembly asked the Court to answer 
the following two questions:
(a) ‘Was the process of decolonization of Mauritius 
lawfully completed when Mauritius was 
granted independence in 1968, following the 
separation of the Chagos Archipelago from 
Mauritius and having regard to international 
law, including obligations reflected in General 
Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 
December 1960, 2066 (XX) of 16 December 
1965, 2232 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 and 
2357 (XXII) of 19 December 1967?’;
(b) ‘What are the consequences under 
international law, including obligations 
reflected in the above-mentioned resolutions, 
arising from the continued administration 
by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland of the Chagos Archipelago, 
including with respect to the inability of 
Mauritius to implement a programme for the 
resettlement on the Chagos Archipelago of its 
nationals, in particular those of Chagossian 
origin?’  
The international community displayed 
widespread interest in the questions posed to 
the Court, with thirty-seven States, in addition 
to the African Union, taking part in either the 
written or the oral proceedings concerning the 
requested Advisory Opinion.61 
This was the twenty-seventh occasion 
on which the International Court of Justice 
received a request for an Advisory Opinion. 
The Court’s jurisdiction to render an Advisory 
Opinion is explicit established in Article 65(1) of 
its Statute, which provides that ‘[t]he Court may 
give an advisory opinion on any legal question at 
the request of whatever body may be authorized 
by or in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations to make such a request.’62 In 
the past, only once has the Court found itself 
lacking the jurisdiction to give an Opinion,63 
and in the present case there were no doubts as 
to the admissibility of the request. The Court 
swiftly agreed that the request was admissible, 
as it was made by the General Assembly and 
both questions submitted could be considered 
of legal character.64 However, as the Court 
emphasised: ‘The fact that [it] has jurisdiction 
does not mean [...] that it is obliged to exercise 
it’.65 In fact, a strong argument raised by some 
of the intervening delegations, and which 
found limited reception from the bench, was 
that the Court should, for the first time in its 
history, exercise its discretion not to render an 
Advisory Opinion, nonetheless, falling within 
its jurisdiction.
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There were four main reasons presented to 
the Court to support the exercise of its discretion 
not to provide the requested Advisory Opinion. 
These were: 
...that, first, advisory proceedings are not 
suitable for determination of complex 
and disputed factual issues; secondly, the 
Court’s response would not assist the 
General Assembly in the performance 
of its functions; thirdly, it would be 
inappropriate for the Court to re-examine 
a question already settled by the Arbitral 
Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of 
UNCLOS in the Arbitration regarding 
the Chagos Marine Protected Area; and 
fourthly, the questions asked in the present 
proceedings relate to a pending bilateral 
dispute between two States which have not 
consented to the settlement of that dispute 
by the Court.
The Court emphasised that only 
‘compelling reasons’ could lead to exercising 
its discretion not to render an Opinion, and 
proceeded to evaluate each of the four reasons 
presented.66 First, it rejected the argument 
that advisory proceedings were not suited to 
dealing with the questions asked, taking the 
position that within the proceedings there was 
enough information on the facts to answer the 
questions.67 Secondly, it affirmed that it was not 
up to the Court, but to the General Assembly, to 
determine whether an answer to the questions 
posed would be of assistance to the latter in 
performing its functions; hence, it also rejected 
that reason to exercise its discretion. Thirdly, 
the Court rejected the third argument raised 
– that of the case having been already decided 
by an Arbitral Tribunal under UNCLOS – for 
two reasons; on the one hand, stating that the 
principle of res judicata does not apply to the 
advisory jurisdiction of the Court; and, on the 
other hand, affirming that the issues under 
analysis were not analogous to those decided by 
the aforementioned tribunal.
Arguably, the strongest reason to support 
the Court’s exercise of discretion was the 
fourth one raised: that the questions asked in 
the advisory proceedings related to an existent 
bilateral dispute between two States – Mauritius 
and the United Kingdom – and that they had 
not consented to the settlement of that dispute 
by the Court. In fact, this reason was accepted 
by two of the Judges: Peter Tomka and Joan 
Donoghue. Both Judges understood that by 
rendering the requested Opinion, the Court 
would be circumventing the lack of consent from 
the United Kingdom to adjudicate a bilateral 
dispute concerning sovereignty over the Chagos 
Archipelago.68 Conversely, the majority of the 
Court rejected this argument. They affirmed 
that the request of the General Assembly was 
not aimed at solving a territorial dispute between 
two States, but that its purpose was rather to help 
the Assembly discharge its functions concerning 
the decolonisation of Mauritius.69 
Having decided to exercise its jurisdiction to 
render the Advisory Opinion, the Court reflected 
upon the first question posed by the General 
Assembly: Was the process of decolonisation 
of Mauritius lawfully completed when gaining 
independence in 1968, taking into consideration 
the separation of the Chagos Islands in 1965? In 
order to answer that question, the Court had to 
determine whether the right to self-determination 
of peoples had already crystallised as a customary 
norm binding on all States at the time of the facts 
– the detachment of the Archipelago in 1965 
and the independence of Mauritius in 1968.70 
Certainly one of the most significant findings 
of the Court was the confirmation that the right 
to self-determination was part of customary 
international law by the end of the year 1960, when 
the General Assembly adopted the Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples (Resolution 1514 (XV)).71 
The Court affirmed that: ‘although resolution 
1514 (XV) is formally a recommendation, it has 
a declaratory character with regard to the right to 
self-determination as a customary norm’.72
Moreover, the Court stated that 
an essential element of the right to self-
determination is the territorial integrity of 
non-self-governing territories. Peoples of these 
territories are entitled to exercise the right to 
self-determination in relation of the entirety of 
their territory. Therefore, the detachment of a 
part of the territory by the administering Power 
would be in clear contravention of the right to 
self-determination, unless based on the freely 
expressed and genuine will of the people entitled 
to exercise such a right.73
When applied to the situation of Mauritius, 
these rules mean that the detachment of the 
Chagos Islands in 1965, prior to independence, 
could only be considered to have been lawfully 
done, if it followed the free and genuine will 
of the people. However, the Court considered 
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that the ‘Lancaster House agreement’, through 
which the detachment was determined, was 
not a reflection of such free and genuine will.74 
In fact, the General Assembly itself, in its 
Resolution 2066 (XX) of 16 December 1965, 
noted ‘with deep concern that any step taken 
by the administering Power to detach certain 
islands from the Territory of Mauritius for the 
purpose of establishing a military base would 
be in contravention of the Declaration [on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples]’.75 Therefore, the conclusion 
reached by the Court was that the process of 
Mauritian decolonisation was not lawfully 
completed when it acceded to independence in 
1968, given that the detachment of the Chagos 
Archipelago in 1965, and its incorporation into 
a new colony (the BIOT), was unlawful.76
After answering the first question in 
the negative, affirming that the process of 
decolonisation of Mauritius had not been lawfully 
completed, the Court provided an answer to 
the second question posed by the General 
Assembly: What are the legal consequences 
arising from the continued administration of 
the Chagos Islands by the United Kingdom? 
In rather clear terms, the Court affirmed that 
the administration of the Chagos Archipelago 
constituted an unlawful act, under international 
law, of a continuing character, which entails 
the international responsibility of the United 
Kingdom.77 Consequently, the United Kingdom 
is under the international obligation to bring to 
an end, as rapidly as possible, the administration 
of the Chagos Archipelago, so to enable the 
completion of the decolonisation process of 
Mauritius ‘in a manner consistent with the right 
of peoples to self-determination’.78 Moreover, 
the Court indicated that it is for the General 
Assembly to determine the modalities required 
for the completion of the de-colonisation 
process of Mauritius, including the issue of 
the resettlement of Mauritian nationals on the 
Chagos Islands, which – the Court emphasised 
– is a topic relating to the protection of human 
rights.79 Nevertheless, the Court clarified that 
‘respect for the right to self-determination is an 
obligation erga omnes, [therefore] all States have 
a legal interest in protecting that right’,80 which 
means that all States need to co-operate with 
the United Nations to complete the process of 
decolonisation of Mauritius.81
While voting together with the majority, 
it is worth highlighting that Judges Tomka and 
Gevorgian expressed their disagreement with 
the Court’s finding that the United Kingdom’s 
continued administration of the Chagos 
Archipelago amounted to an internationally 
wrongful act that engages its international 
responsibility. Both Judges considered that such 
a finding was not appropriate for the context on 
an Advisory Opinion, blurring the lines between 
the advisory and contentious jurisdictions 
of the Court.82 Although Judge Gevorgian 
acknowledged that similar statements have been 
made by the Court in other Advisory Opinions 
– such as in the Advisory Opinion on the Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia83 or in 
the Opinion on the Legal Consequences of 
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory84 –, he affirmed that those 
cases should be distinguished from the present 
one, since on those occasions the United Nations 
Security Council had already established the 
illegality of the situation.85
While Judges Donoghue, Tomka and 
Gevorgian believed for different reasons that 
the Court had exceeded its authority, other 
judges considered that the Court might 
have actually failed to go far enough. Judges 
Sebutinde, Robinson, Salam and, of course, 
Cançado Trindade appended their respective 
declarations and separate opinions indicating 
certain shortcomings of the Court’s decision. In 
particular, their respective votes highlighted the 
value of other resolutions adopted by the General 
Assembly;86 the lack of any consideration of 
the issue of reparations, following the finding 
of an internationally wrongful act;87 and the 
understanding that the right to self-determination 
should not only be viewed as a customary norm 
that imposes erga omnes obligations, but as a 
norm belonging to the domain of jus cogens.88 
From these separate opinions, we will pay 
closer attention to the detailed, comprehensive, 
and solidly-grounded individual vote of Judge 
Cançado Trindade, which almost doubled in 
length the decision adopted by the Court, as 
it is particularly insightful in bringing to the 
forefront the legal history of the principle of self-
determination and its close connection with the 
suffering of the Chagossians.
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a. The separate opinion of Judge 
Cançado Trindade
For those of us who have engaged over the 
decades with the jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, there was 
always an expectation that Judge Cançado 
Trindade would offer deep and carefully crafted 
reflections from the bench. The separate 
opinions issued by Judge Cançado Trindade have 
come to satisfy the legal curiosity of academic 
readers, providing a new opportunity to learn 
about, and reflect on, international law. On this 
occasion, his separate opinion started with a 
comprehensive legal history of the engagement 
with the right to self-determination within the 
ambit of the United Nations. It covered the 
numerous resolutions the General Assembly 
approved through the 1950s, which led to the 
adoption of Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 
1960,89 the one that, according to the Court, 
reflected the normative character of the right to 
self-determination. However, the historical legal 
development of the right to self-determination 
within the United Nations did not end in 1960. 
Judge Cançado Trindade’s opinion highlighted 
the many resolutions the General Assembly 
continued to adopt during the 1960s and 1970s, 
which included – among many – the creation of 
the Special Committee on Decolonization, with 
the mission to monitor the implementation of 
Resolution 1514 (XV),90 as well as a resolution on 
the ‘Question of Mauritius’, in which it warned 
that the detachment of certain islands from the 
territory of Mauritius would be in contravention 
of the Resolution 1514 (XV).91 
Moreover, the right to self-determination 
would be inserted within the two United Nations 
Conventions on Human Rights adopted in 
1966 – the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights –, both 
of which treaties begin with an identical Article 
1, which states:
1.  All peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, 
including those having responsibility for 
the administration of Non-Self-Governing 
and Trust Territories, shall promote the 
realization of the right of self-determination, 
and shall respect that right, in conformity 
with the provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations.92
The Human Rights Committee, the 
monitoring body of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, affirmed that the 
right recognised in Article 1 of both Covenants 
enshrines an inalienable right of all peoples 
and that States Parties to these treaties are 
under the obligation to respect such a right 
not only in relation to their own peoples, but 
towards all peoples deprived of the possibility of 
exercising this right.93 Judge Cançado Trindade 
further highlighted how the Committee had 
raised the issue of compliance with the right 
to self-determination in the specific case of the 
Chagos Archipelago in concluding observations 
to reports submitted by the United Kingdom 
under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.94 The Committee has stated 
that the United Kingdom should ensure that 
the Chagos islander can exercise their right to 
return to their territory and should also consider 
the payment of compensation for the denial of 
this right over such an extended period of time.95
On the other hand, the separate opinion 
of Judge Cançado Trindade fairly addressed the 
engagement of the European Court of Human 
Rights with the situation of the Chagossians 
– which was discussed above.96 In its reasoned 
assessment, the separate opinion expressed 
regret about the fact that the European Court of 
Human Rights failed to deal with the merits of 
the case brought by the Chagos islanders, finding 
their claims to be inadmissible on procedural 
grounds. Judge Cançado Trindade exposed the 
excessive formalism underlying the approach 
adopted by the European Court of Human 
Rights, which led it to reject the Chagossians’ 
claims due to its restrictive interpretation of the 
concept of ‘victim’ and of the requirement to 
exhaust domestic remedies.97
Judge Cançado Trindade also discussed the 
case law of the International Court of Justice 
concerning the right to self-determination.98 
This case law has as its starting point the 
Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences 
for States of the Continued Presence of South 
Africa in Namibia from 1971, in which the 
Court recognised that the development of 
international law had led the principle of self-
determination to be applicable to all non-self-
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governing territories.99 It continued in the 
Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara from 
1975, as the Court emphasised that the exercise 
of the right to self-determination requires a free 
and genuine expression of the will of the people 
concerned.100 A further step in the recognition 
of the right to self-determination by the 
International Court of Justice, as explained by 
Judge Cançado Trindade, took place in 1995, in 
the judgment on the East Timor case (Portugal v 
Australia), in which the Court affirmed the right 
to self-determination as one of the ‘essential 
principles of contemporary international law’ 
that is endowed with an erga omnes character.101 
The erga omnes character of the right to self-
determination was further confirmed by the 
Court in its 2004 Advisory Opinion on the Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory.102 Lastly, in 
the 2010 Advisory Opinion on the Declaration 
of Independence of Kosovo, the Court stated 
that the development of the international 
law of self-determination has created ‘a right 
to independence for the peoples of non-self-
governing territories and peoples subject to alien 
subjugation, domination and exploitation’.103
A further issue discussed in the separate 
opinion concerned the question posed by 
Judge Cançado Trindade to the intervening 
delegations, at the end of the oral advisory 
proceedings, which received a significant number 
of written answers. The question was as follows: 
‘In your understanding, what are the legal 
consequences ensuing from the formation of 
customary international law with the significant 
presence of opinio juris communis for ensuring 
compliance with the obligations stated in [the] 
General Assembly resolutions [mentioned 
in the request for this Opinion]?’104 The 
response from the delegations overwhelmingly 
stressed the ‘opinio juris communis as to the 
considerable importance of the fundamental 
right to self-determination (as from General 
Assembly resolution 1514(XV) of 1960) to the 
progressive development of (conventional and 
customary) international law, as well as to its 
universalization and humanization.’105 Only 
the delegations from the United Kingdom and 
the United States sought to cast doubts as to 
the obligations emanating from the pertinent 
resolutions of the General Assembly.106  
Judge Cançado Trindade’s separate opinion 
went on to reflect upon the jus cogens character of 
the fundamental right to self-determination, and 
did so by taking the reader on a journey through 
the International Court of Justice’s case law 
on the topic of jus cogens. He emphasised that 
only brief references to jus cogens/peremptory 
norms can be found within the Court’s rulings, 
enumerating the following ones:
North Sea Continental Shelf (of 
20.02.1969, para. 72), Nicaragua versus 
United States (of 27.06.1986, para. 190), 
Arrest Warrant (of 14.02.2002, paras. 56 and 
58), Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (of 
03.02.2012, paras. 92-93 and 95-97), as well 
as in its Advisory Opinions of Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons (of 08.07.1996, para. 
83), and of Kosovo (of 22.07.2010, para. 81). 
The ICJ went further than that, in the case 
of the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, 
in stating, in its Judgment (of 20.07.2012), 
that “the prohibition of torture is part of 
customary international law and it has become 
a peremptory norm (jus cogens)” (para. 99).107
To these, he added the affirmation of 
the prohibition of genocide as a norm of jus 
cogens character, made by the Court in its 
judgment in Armed Activities on the Territory 
of the Congo, later confirmed in the two cases 
of the Application of the Convention against 
Genocide.108 These rather limited interventions 
from the Court, to which is possible to add the 
absence of any references to peremptory norms 
in the present case, led Judge Cançado Trindade 
to express his criticism to the slow and reluctant 
approach adopted by the Court on the topic of 
jus cogens.109
In contrast, the development of the material 
content of jus cogens has been a task undertaken 
by individual judges, such as Cançado Trindade 
himself. His separate and dissenting opinions 
from the bench of the International Court of 
Justice – and before then from his seat at the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights –110 have 
provided careful reflections that have helped to 
shape the scope of international jus cogens. His 
current opinion provided a brief recollection 
of some of these memorable interventions in 
different cases, which included his dissenting 
opinion in the Application of the Convention 
against Genocide case (Croatia v Serbia); his 
(three) dissenting opinions in the case on the 
Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating 
to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and 
to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands 
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v United Kingdom, India and Pakistan); his 
separate vote in the Advisory Opinion on the 
Declaration of Independence of Kosovo; his 
memorable dissenting opinions in the case of 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany 
v Italy); his dissent in the case of the Application 
of the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v 
Russian Federation); his opinion in the case of 
the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium 
v Senegal); and his separate opinion in the case 
of A.S. Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic 
Republic of the Congo).111
The seriousness that his current opinion 
attached to the breach of international law 
under analysis – an understanding shared by 
Judges Sebutinde and Robinson –112 led to 
further reflections on two interconnected topics: 
that of suffering and reparations. Concerning 
suffering, Judge Cançado Trindade managed 
to offer a vivid picture of the suffering of the 
victims who have been uprooted through the 
forced expulsion from the Chagos Archipelago 
to allow for the installation of a military base 
of the United States. The unforgettable story 
of Ms. M. Liseby Elysé, from which exerts are 
shared in the separate opinion, was linked by 
the Judge to different extracts from ancient 
Greek tragedies, showing the timeless character 
of profound human suffering when violence 
is imposed to the detriment of the vulnerable 
victims.113 Nonetheless, this suffering was not 
presented by Judge Cançado Trindade for us to 
resign ourselves to the subsistence of injustice, 
but to bear in mind that the consistency of 
human cruelty along the centuries has led to 
the awakening of human conscience to the need 
to bring justice to the victims. As he wisely 
claimed: ‘The sufferings imposed by colonialism 
throughout the last centuries continue nowadays 
to be studied, with growing attention, for the 
sake of the preservation of memory in the search 
of justice.’114
As to reparations, the separate opinion 
of Judge Cançado Trindade clearly affirmed 
the indissoluble link between a breach of 
international law and the duty of reparations 
– a position also shared by Judge Salam.115 In 
other words, when a court of law establishes the 
existence of an internationally wrongful act – as 
in the present case – it also should determine 
the measures that need to be adopted to bring 
to an end all the effects of the breach and to 
ensure respect for the legal order. Moreover, 
such reparations should encompass a variety 
of measures, namely: ‘restitutio in integrum, 
appropriate compensation, satisfaction 
(including public apology), rehabilitation of 
the victims, guarantee of non-repetition of 
the harmful acts or omissions.’116 It is worth 
remembering that if reparations were to have 
been established by the Court in this case, it 
would not have been the first time in which 
the Court determined reparations within the 
context of an Advisory Opinion.117
4. CONCLUSION
As a final reflection, it is encouraging 
to see that the International Court of Justice 
confirmed its practice of not hiding away from 
rendering Advisory Opinions on rather sensitive 
topics. With the sole (real) dissent of Judge 
Donoghue (from the United States) and some 
clear reticence expressed by Judge Tomka (from 
Slovakia), the Court confirmed that already by 
the end of 1960 the right to self-determination 
was part of customary law. This stance was also 
supported by the vast majority of the delegations 
that intervened in the proceedings before 
the Court, which actually highlights another 
positive element to extract from this case; the 
fact that so many States (and an international 
organisation) displayed their belief in the 
value of the International Court of Justice as 
an appropriate forum for international dispute 
settlement. Furthermore, different voices from 
the bench emphasised their conviction that the 
right to self-determination of peoples belongs 
to the realm of jus cogens, revealing a clear 
commitment with the idea that the developing 
law of decolonisation became an undeniable 
manifestation of the humanisation of 
contemporary international law, an unstoppable 
trend of the prevalence of the raison d’humanité 
over the old raison d’État in the framework of 
the jus gentium of our times.118
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